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INTRODUCTION
"It's like we've given them the keys to the car ... but haven't
taught them how to drive. "
In June 2008, a sleepy, working-class town in Massachusetts
shocked the country when news of a teenage pregnancy pact exploded
across the headlines.2 At Gloucester High, the one public high school for
the entire seacoast town of about 30,000, a record eighteen girls were
pregnant at the end of the 2008 school year.' That number wais more
than quadruple the three to four pregnancies Gloucester High averaged
in years leading up to 2008.' When news of a "pregnancy pact"1 amongst
the Gloucester teenagers hit the papers, there was national outcry; repre-
sentations of teenage girls high-fiying each other after positive
pregnancy tests and proudly coordinating plans for baby showers and
future play dates flooded the media! The bottom line was that Ameri-
cans were shocked and horrified at the idea that these immature teenage
1. Belinda Luscombe, The Truth about Teen Girls, TIME, Sept. 11, 2008 (quoting
Sharon Maxwell), available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1 840556,00.html.
2. See Kathleen Kingsbury, Pregnancy Boom at Gloucester High, TIME, June 18, 2008,
available at hitp://www.time.com/time/world/articde/0,8599, 181 5845,00.html (break-
ing the news of a pregnancy pact amongst Gloucester High School students).
3. See Paul Anderson, Gloucester High School's Day-Care Center Overflowing for Septem-
ber, GLOUCESTER DAILY TIMES, June 19, 2008, available at http://ww~w.
gloucesterimes.com/punews/localsory171221 140.html (describing the impact of
the Gloucester High teenage pregnancy pact on the high school's day-care program).
4. See Kingsbury, supra note 2.
5. See id.
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girls came together and encouraged-even promised-each other to get
pregnant. Many were left asking, "Where were the parents in all this?",
6
Ironically, the very fact that these girls sought to have babies was
the reason why their parents were never required to be involved in the
first place. In Massachusetts, statutory rape laws establish the age of con-
sent at sixteen years old . This means that a teenager of sixteen can not
only consent to have sex, but also choose to get pregnant, and there is
absolutely nothing her parents, or the law, can do about it. Yet, if the
same teenager seeks to terminate her pregnancy, she is required to obtain
either parental consent or judicial bypass.' The law in Massachusetts,
like many other states around the country, allows for teenage girls to
consent to sex, obtain contraception, accept or decline pre-natal care,
bear children, and even put those children up for adoption, without any
parental involvement, legal counsel, or medical consultation! Indeed,
only in the context of abortion are minors required to obtain either pa-
rental consent or judicial bypass.1 0
6. See Kathleen Kingsbury, Gloucester Pregnancy Plot Thickens, TIME, June 23, 2008,
available at h ttp: //www. time. com/time/ nation /article/0, 8 599, 18 17272,00. h ml.
7. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 23 (2008) ("Whoever unlawfully has sexual
intercourse or unnatural sexual in~tercourse, and abuses a child unider 16 years of age,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years
or, except as otherwise provided, for any term in a jail or house of correction."); see
also Table 1, infra pp. 65-66 (comparing statewide ages of consent to parental in-
volvement statutes).
8. See Table 1, supra note 7.
9. See Kingsbury, supra note 2 (describing the pregnancy pact in Gloucester and paren-
tal hostility towards the distribution of contraceptives without parental notification);
STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MINORS' RIGHTS AS PARENTS ALAN GUTTMAcVER INST.,
(Apr. 1, 2009), available at http:/lwww. guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib-MRP.pdf (presenting information on minor parenting and adoption regula-
tions.) Somewhat ironically, many Gloucester parents had been involved in a recent
campaign against the distribution of oral contraceptives at the high school without
parental consent. Notably, no state in the country currently requires any form of pa-
rental notification or consent for the distribution of oral contraceptives to minors.
Yet, the Gloucester High parents raised such outcry that the mayor of the town de-
nounced the practice on the grounds of parental rights, stating that the health
professionals engaging in this practice at the high school "had no right to decide this
for our children." The two health professionals who had sought to distribute the con-
traceptives, local pediatrician Dr. Brian Orr and nurse-practitioner Kim Daly, were
so concerned about the reptoductive health harms this prohibition would cause the
teens at Gloucester High that they resigned in protest. See Kingsbury, supra note 2;
Patricia Donovan, Parental Notification: Is it Settled?, 13 FAm. PLAN. PERsp. 243,
243-46 (1981).
10. See Table 1, supra note 7 (comparing and describing age of consent and minor abor-
tion restrictions statewide).
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The situation in Gloucester exposes the underlying incoherence of
laws regulating adolescent sexuality in the United States. Nationally, the
median age of consent is sixteen,"' with some states allowing for consent
as young as fourteen."2 The emblematic "coming of age" at sixteen in-
stantly transforms a minor who was incapable of consent the day before
into a sexually autonomous entity. Although ages may vary, every state
has an age of consent law that vests in a minor the right to engage in
sexual activity and to become pregnant without any parental involve-
ment whatsoever." Yet in the majority of jurisdictions, a minor's right to
independently consent to sex, become pregnant, and bear a child fails to
be matched by a corresponding right to terminate her pregnancy with-
out parental involvement." As of 2004, twenty-six states have statutory
schemes that set the age of consent below the age at which a minor can
independently obtain an abortion." Read together, these statutes enable
teenagers to have sex and become pregnant but then condition repro-
ductive rights upon whether the minor chooses to proceed with the
pregnancy. The law privileges the minor who chooses to have her baby
with legal independence and decisional autonomy." In contrast, the law
penalizes the minor who seeks an abortion by subjecting her reproduc-
tive decision to parental notification, consent, or judicial bypass.
Legally speaking, sexual maturity poses a significant enough liberty
interest for a minor to make medical decisions regarding contraceptive
medicine or to choose motherhood without parental involvement, but
not quite enough for her to obtain an abortion independently.'" The law
incentivizes teenage motherhood by only granting decisional autonomy
to those minors who choose to have a child; the minor female's right to
11. See Table 1, supra note 7.
12. See id.
13. Every state in the United States fixes the age of consent in the form of statutory rape
laws. Luisa A. Fuentes. The 14th Amendment and Sexual Consent: Statutory Rape and
Judiciary Progeny, 16 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP'. 139, 140 (1994).
14. See Table 1, supra note 7. Interestingly, only ten states require some form of third-
parry involvement where a minor parent seeks to place her child up for adoption; five
states require legal counsel for a minor adoptee; four states require parental notifica-
tion; and one state requires parental consent. See ALAN GuJrrmACHER INST., supra
note 9.
15. See Table 1, supra note 7.
16. See ALAN GUTrMACHER INST., supra note 9.
17. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 682 (1977) (holding that any
statute unconditionally prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors under the age
of sixteen violates that minor's right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1169 (6th Cir. 1980) (reasoning that a publicly oper-
ated family planning agency, providing contraceptives to minors, did not violate
parental liberty interests in raising children).
274 [Vol. 17:271
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procreate vests regardless of her individual maturity. The law discourages
teenage abortions by using the choice to terminate a pregnancy to trig-
ger a presumption of immaturity; the minor female's abortion right is
pitted against personal autonomy via parental rights."8 Ultimately, this
Article argues that sexually active minors, their children, and their par-
ents all suffer in this reproductive catch-22.
This Article contends that the conflict between age of consent laws
and minor abortion restrictions is just one illustration of state legisla-
tures' struggles within the greater protecnionist-versus-enablement
paradigm. Specifically, this Article argues that laws regulating adolescent
sexuality can generally be categorized into one of two types:
(1) protectionist, enacting restrictions and protections designed to com-
pensate for minors' categorical immaturity; or (2) enabling, recognizing
adult-like capacity and rights in minors as they progress in their overall
development. The result of this polarized statutory landscape can only
adequately be described as "legislative schizophrenia"-al though devoid
of invidious intent, these statutes ultimately hurt minors because they
are premised on a flawed paradigm that is unable to coordinate the dif-
ferent political and social goals of state legislatures."
This Article argues that by recognizing consensual maturity for in-
tercourse and pregnancy but then rescinding that presumptive maturity
only for abortion, states both violate the Constitution and create dan-
gerous public policy. Specifically, states violate legally-consenting
minors' substantive due process rights by imposing undue burdens on
their abortion access without any legitimate, countervailing immaturity
interest."' While parental notification and consent laws have been up-
held on the grounds of minor immaturity, this Article argues that the
recognition of sexual maturity through age of consent laws should also
trigger a presumption of maturity for minor abortion rights."' This
18. It should come as no surprise that the abortion rate of women aged 15- 19 is a mere
19.2%. See ALAN CUTTMACHZER INST., IN BRIEF: FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION
IN THE UNITED STATES (May 2010), available at http:/lwww. guttmacher.org/pubs/
fb induced-abortiOn.pdf. Abortions performed on women under the age of nineteen
comprise only 18% of all abortions in the United States, the lowest rare of any age
bracket other than that for women over forty years old. See ALAN GUTrMACHER
INST., U.S. TEENAGE PREGNANCIES, BIRTHS, AND ABORTIONS: NATIONAL AND STATE
TRENDS By RACE AND ETHNICITYa(anuary 2010), available at www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/USTPtrends.pdf.
19. Christopher Aaron Jones, Note, Legislative "Subterfisge": Failing to Insure Persons with
Mental Illness Under the Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 50 VAND. L. REv. 753, 783 (1997) (defining "legislative schizophrenia" vis-a-vis
"legislative subterfuge").
20. See infra Part hIA.
21. Setid.
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Article further highlights five key policy concerns created by the incon-
sistent regulation of adolescent sexuality: (1) the encouragement of
impulsive adolescent sexual behaviors; (2) the binding of decisional au-
tonomy to pregnancy outcome; (3) the reinforcement of paternalistic
gender stereotypes; (4) the punitive, rather than protective, natre of
parental involvement and judicial bypass; and (5) the continued hysteri-
cization of adolescent sexuality.
22
To remedy both the specific conflict created by age of consent and
parental involvement laws and the greater flawed paradigm of protec-
tionism-versus-enablement, this Article argues for the adoption of an
alternative regulatory framework, referred to as the Minor Consent Ca-
pacity (MCC) status proposal. Whereas the existing literature on
reforming adolescent sexuality has generally focused on single statutory
issues, such as the rejection or defense of parental involvement laws, this
Article advances a novel proposal to overhaul the entire body of laws
regulating adolescent sexuality.23 Looking beyond the particular legal
conflict created by inconsistent age of consent and parental involvement
laws, the MCC status proposal fuses a system of sexual education and
consent licensure to regulate minors' sexual and reproductive consent
capacity. The MCC status proposal flatly rejects the current practice of
recognizing maturity at the age of consent but then limiting the legal
significance of that maturity in the context of abortion. Rather, the
MCC status proposal licenses sexual and reproductive consent capacity
once a minor has fulfilled certain objective educational and evaluative
24
requirements.
Part I of this Article examines the historical development of age of
consent statutes as "enabling" and parental involvement requirements as
"1protectionist." By comparing the two, this Part exposes how the parallel
development of such laws has created conflicting notions of sexual and
reproductive maturity. Part 11 of this Article lays out both the constitu-
tional and public policy problems created by the conflict between age of
consent laws and parental involvement requirements. Using the consti-
tutional and public policy concerns presented in Part 11, this Article
then suggests an alternative statutory framework for the more compre-
hensive regulation of adolescent sexuality. Part III first explains how
22. See infra Part 11. B.
23. See, e.g., Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper v. Simmons: 'Kids are
Just Diffe~rent" and "Kids are Like Adults" Strategies, 6 CARoDozo PUB. L. POL'Y & E-
ics J. 273 (2008) (critiquing parental notification and consent laws); Carol Sanger,
Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States: Politics and Policy, 18 INT'L J. L.
POL'Y & F~m. 305, 311[-12 (2004) (criticizing parental involvement and judicial by-
pass processes as "punishment" for minor sex).
24. See infra Part 1I.D.
Vol. 17:271276
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existing alternatives, such as statutory reform and status exemptions, fail
to address the greater problems inherent in the protectionism-versus-
enablement paradigm. Ultimately advocating the MCC status proposal
to overhaul the entire regulation of adolescent sexuality, this Article pro-
poses that we use consent licensure to facilitate more informed and
socially responsible adolescent sexual behaviors.
1. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AGE OF CONSENT LAWS AND
PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT REQUIREMENTS
This Part offers brief histories of both age of consent laws and pa-
rental involvement requirements for minor abortions. Drawing on the
language and purpose of statutory rape laws, this Part categorizes age of
consent laws as "enabling" regulations, through which the state recog-
nizes a minor's sexual autonomy. Conversely, parental consent and
notification requirements for abortion reflect "protectionist" limitations
on adolescent sexuality. These regulations are protectionist because they
justify the differential treatment of minor abortion rights from adult
abortion rights on the basis of adolescent immaturity. Offering a stare-
by-state comparison of ages of consent to the ages at which a minor may
independently obtain an abortion, this Part concludes with a summary
of the legal implications of these two statutory schemes."5
A. Age of Consent Laws: Enabling Adolescent Sexuality
States establish the age of sexual consent through statutory rape
26
laws . Statutory rape is the crime of sexual intercourse with a person
under the age of consent, regardless of whether it is against that person's
Will1.7 In virtually all jurisdictions, the age of consent is the defining el-
ement of statutory rape law; it establishes [he threshold age at which a
person may lawfully choose to engage in sexual intercourse. 28In most
jurisdictions, statutory rape is a strict liability crime, to which neither
25. See infra Table 1.
26. See BLACK's L~w DICTIONARY, Age (Black's Law Dictionary Digital CD-ROM, 8th
ed. 2004).
27. Statutory rape is defined as "Unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age
of consent (as defined by statute), regardless of whether it is against that person's will.
Generally, only an adult may be convicted of this crime. A person under the age of
consent cannot be convicted." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, Statutoy Rape, (Black's
Law Dictionary Digital CD-ROM, 8th ed. 2004).
28. See 65 Ams. JUR. 2d Rape § 14 (1972) (defining the legal implications of the "age
limit" in statutory rape laws).
20111 277
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the willingness (non-legal "consent") of the underage partner nor mis-
take of age is a defense .2 ' American statutory rape law was based on
standards for the age of consent established in England.3 0 Following a
common law tradition in which the "age of female discretion" was origi-
nally set at twelve years, the first age of consent regulation in England
was established by parliamentary statute in 1 576."' This statute desig-
nated the age of consent at ten years and explicitly criminalized sexual
relations with any child under the age of consent "without the benefit of
clergy" as a felony.312 In the United States, all states have adopted some
form of a statutory rape law, 33 fixing the age of consent between four-
teen3  and eighteen years of age.3 In the American tradition, statutory
36
rape laws have been the subject of much debate,3 ranging from the
constitutionality of gender-specific language, to the mistake of age de-
fense,3  to the wisdom of using statutory rape law enforcement to
prevent teenage pregnancies and reduce public assistance to teenage
mothers .3 ' The underlying rationale for statutory rape is often related
29. See 75 C.J.. Rape § 6 (1952) (explaining the unavailability of mistake of age defenses
to statutory rape charges).
30. See MARY E. ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING ADOLES-
CENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885-1920 13 (1995) (describing
the history and evolution of American "age of consent" laws relating back to their
English influences).
31. See ODEM, supra note 30.
32. See id.
33. See Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In Search of Rea-
son, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 60 (1997) (presenting a table of ages of consent for
penetration and sexual contact in the United States).
34. Over the course of U.S. history, age of consent laws have permitted sexual consent as
young as seven years old, although now the lowest age of consent in any U.S. jurisdic-
tion is fourteen. See ODEM, supra note 30, at 13.
35. See Phipps, supra note 33, at 60.
36. See Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Sexual Activity
Between Teenagers, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'v 373. 375-76 (2003) (listing out
the areas of contemporary scholarly debate on statutory tape law in the United
States).
37. See, e.g., Alice Susan Andre-Clark, Note, Whither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael
M., The Fourteenth Amendment, and Protecting Women from Sexual Aggression, 65 S.
CAL. L. Ray. 1933 (1992). See generally Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
38. See, e.g., Larry W. Myers, Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to Statutory
Rape, 64 MICH. L. Ray. 105 (1965-1966); Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory
Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 Am. U.L. REV. 313,
316-17 (2003-2004).
39. See Elizabeth Hollenberg, The Criminalization of Teenage Sex: Statutory Rpe and the
Politics of Teenage Motherhood, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 267, 277 (1999) (recogniz-
ing that statutory rape laws have increasingly been used to prevent teenage pregnancy
but also arguing that there need to be additional social welfare mechanisms in place
Vol. 17:271278
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back to the premise that "young people are incapable of understanding
the full significance and consequences of certain acts in which they
might willingly engage . .. [and where such] understanding is lacking
... there can be no true 'consent' to it in the sight of the law."40
Recently, there has been notable scholarly debate about how well
statutory rape laws actually regulate minor sexual activity." In particular,
statutory rape laws have been criticized as ineffective means to address
the risks inherent in adolescent sexual activity, a normal and healthy part
of "coming of age." Much ofthis debate focuses on the use of age as
the legal indicator of sexual maturity, as compared to other developmen-
tal attributes."3 While statutory rape laws may be categorically criticized
for restricting otherwise mature minors from giving consent, the reverse
implication is that such laws also unequivocally enable minors to con-
sent to sexual activity at the given statutory age. Specifically, age of
consent laws are legally enabling insofar as they confer upon adolescents
the right to consent to sexual activity. Although it may be somewhat
counterintuitive to categorize statutory rape law as enabling, statutory
rape only exists as a crime because it establishes the baseline age at which
a minor's sexual consent becomes legally significant. When a minor
reaches the age of consent, the law shifts from presuming immaturity
to maturity so that minor becomes legally capable of consensual sexual
to effectively address the problem). Notably, several legislative initiatives designed to
use statutory rape laws to curb teenage pregnancy and reduce public assistance to
teenage mothers have also received significant attention in the general media. See gen-
erally Patricia Edmonds, Teen Pregnanty Revives Laws on Statutory Rape, U.S.A.
TODAY, Mar. 28, 1996, at IA; Sandra Gonzales, State Officials Cracking Down on
Statutory Rape, L.A. DAILY NEws, Sept. 1, 1996, at N21.
40. See LAUREN KROHN ARNEST, CHILDREN, YOUNG ADULTS, AND THE LAW: A Dic-
TIONARY 276 (1998).
41. See generally Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern
Statutry Rape Law, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 109 (2004); Phipps, supra note 33
and note 36.
42. Statutory rape laws have been criticized as detrimental to the meaningful exercise of
"girls' autonomy in sexual decision-making." See Oberman, supra note 41, at 177
(arguing for the "revival and reconfiguration" of statutory rape laws to affirm sexually
active minor female autonomy and reinforce meaningful consent). While I
acknowledge this contemporary debate and the recent criticism regarding "age of
consent" laws in promoting adolescent sexual and moral agency, I will not address the
merits of such qualitative debate in this Article. Rather I interpret statutory rape laws
as legally enabling a person to make sexual decisions at a threshold age.
43. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, "Developing Consent"s Adolescent "Consent" at Work, at Law,
and in the Sciences of the Mind, 10 U.C. DAvis J. JUv. L. & POL'Y 1(2006) (arguing
that adolescent development, adolescent sexuality, and chidl/adolescent sexual abuse
should be central factors in informing the debate about adolescent consent).
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4
activity. Thus, as derived from statutory rape law, age of consent regu-
lations formally confer consent-giving capacity, and therefore they
illustrate an enablement-type regulation of adolescent sexuality."5
B. Parental Involvement Requirements: Protecting Immature Children46
Since recognizing a woman's fundamental right to an abortion in
Roe v. Wade, the Court has treated minor abortion rights very differently
from general adult abortion rights . 4 ' The Court has justified the differ-
ential treatment of minor abortion rights on two grounds: 1) presump-
presumptive minor immaturity and 2) parental rights to be involved in a
minor child's abortion decision .4 8 The Court most expressly addressed
differential minor abortion rights in the 1979 case, Bellotti v. Baird.4"
There the Court specifically acknowledged the tension between protect-
ing a woman's right to obtain an abortion and recognizing "the peculiar
vulnerability of children." 0
While the Court found the particular statute at issue in Beilotti un-
constitutional because it gave parents "potential veto power" over their
daughter's ability to obtain an abortion,"' it also explained that "parental
guidance" was a desirable counterweight to minor females' inherent ina-
bility "to make fully informed choices [raking into account] both
44. See 75 C.J.S. Rape § 57 (describing the shift in presumption of capacity when a mi-
nor reaches the age of consent but also describing that the presumption is still
rebuttable even after the age of consent, depending upon incapacitation, helplessness,
mental or physical disability, etc.).
45. Whether "age of consent" laws vitiate the meaningfulness of consent for minors who
desire to have sex before they are legally permitted to do so is not the focus of this Ar-
ticle. Instead this Article categorizes statutory rape laws as "enabling" because they
create the legal presumption of consent-capacity of minors who have reached a given
age.
46. For a detailed background of the evolution of laws governing parental notification
and consent for minor abortions, see J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of
Their Lives: Listening to Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving
Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 61 (2003); J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Shifting
Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal Culpability and the Indeterminate Legal Status of Ado-
lescents, 18 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003).
47. See Roe v. Wade, 4 10 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (recognizing the right to obtain an abor-
tion as grounded in "zones of privacy" protected by substantive due process); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (finding a Massachusetts parental consent re-
quirement unconstitutional, but explaining that parental involvement limitations on
minor abortions could be constitutional if they included a judicial bypass option).
48. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640-42.
49. See Ehrlich, supra note 46, at 64.
50. See Ehrlich, supra note 46, at 64 (quoting Beilotti, 443 U.S. at 643).
51. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 6 4 0- 4 1.
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immediate and long-range consequences" of an abortion.12 More specifi-
cally, the Court reasoned: "As immature minors often lack the ability to
make fully informed decisions ... a State reasonably may determine that
parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the
minor."" To allow states the opportunity to require such parental in-
volvement, the Court specifically permitted parental notification or
consent requirements so long as there was also "an alternative procedure
whereby authorization for the abortion [could be] obtained."" This
holding has served as the basis for the judicial bypass requirement for
minor abortion restrictions.
Following a rash of state attempts to further limit abortion proce-
dures, the Court revisited the constitutional test for substantive due
process abortion rights in Planned Parenthood v. Casey."5 There, while the
Court reaffirmed the fundamental right to an abortion under Roe, it
replaced Roe's constitutional test, the strict scrutiny standard, with a new
undue burdens test.5 6 Specifically addressing the issue of minor abortion
rights in Casey, the Court held that a "parental consent" provision with a
judicial bypass option did not impose an "undue burden" on the abor-
tion right.517 In defense of its holding, the Court explained that parental
involvement laws were "reasonably designed to further the State's im-
portant and legitimate interest 'in the welfare of its young citizens,
whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes
impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely."' In upholding the
constitutionality of parental involvement laws, the Court's reasoning
further supported the legitimacy of parental protectionism in counter-
balancing minor abortion rights.5 9 While the Court may have "enabled"
abortion rights for adult women, it has exponentially limited minor
abortion rights in favor of parental involvement.6 For the purposes of
52. See Beloti. 443 U.S. at 640.
53. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622. 643 (1979).
54. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643.
55. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
56. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
57. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
58. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 970-71 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444
(1990)).
59. See Ehrlich, supra note 46, at 65 ("Since 1979, the Court has not wavered from its
belief in these interconnected assumptions about teen decisional incapacity and the
ameliorative effect of parental engagement using this belief to justify limiting the re-
productive rights of young women.").
60. See Belltni, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (reasoning that parental consent requirements
were constitutional so long as there were some other alternatives by which a minor
could obtain authorization for an abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462
U.S. 476, 493 (1983) (holding that a parental consent statute was constitutional
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this Article then, parental involvement requirements are treated as pro-
tectionist laws.
C Comparing Age of Consent Laws and Parental
Involvement Requirements
There is widespread statutory inconsistency between the age at
which a minor may consent to sexual activity and the age at which a
minor may obtain an abortion without parental involvement. Across the
states, ages of consent range from fourteen years old to eighteen years
old."' Ages of consent sometimes further vary depending upon the sex,
62
age-differential, and marital status of a minor. For unmarried minors,
the youngest age of consent in any state is fourteen years old .63 The most
common age of consent across the states is sixteen years old. 6 A total of
thirty-four states set the general age of consent for sexual intercourse at
sixteen years old when no other contingencies apply.6" Five of the states
that generally set the age of consent at sixteen years old increase the age
of consent to eighteen where there is a particular age difference between
the two parties.6
On the matter of minor abortions, thirty-four states in the U.S. re-
quire some form of parental involvement where a female under the age
of eighteen seeks an abortion .6 7 Of those, twenty-two require either one
or both parents to consent to the procedure .6 ' Eleven states require ei-
ther one or both parents to be notified of the procedure .6 9 Two states
require both parental notification and consent for a minor to obtain an
abortion.7
where it included a judicial authorization provision); Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (holding
that a parental consent provision did not impose an undue burden on a minor's abor-
tion).
61. Every state in the United States has some form of statutory rape law which fixes the
legal age of consent. Fuentes, supra note 13, at 140.
62. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., STATUTORY RAPE: AGUIDE TO STATE
LAWS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (2004).
63. See supra note 62, at 6.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See AVERT, Worldwide Ages of Consent, http://wwwv.avert.org/aofconsenr.htm (last
visited Nov. 7, 20 10).
67. See AuAN GUTTMACHER INST., STATE OF POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN~ OVERVIEW OF ABOR-
TION LAWS (2010), available at http:/lwww.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib-OAL.pdf.
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Reading the two statutory schemes together, the problem becomes
apparent: as of 2004, twenty-six of the thirty-four states requiring some
form of parental involvement in minor abortions set the age of consent
below the age at which a minor may obtain an abortion without paren-
tal involvement."1 In short, these states grant minor females the right to
privately and independently consent to intercourse and even mother-
hood, but not the corresponding right to obtain an abortion without
parental involvement. Part 11 of this Article examines the constitutional
substantive due process claims and policy concerns that emanate from
parental involvement requirements where the state has already recog-
nized a minor's privacy right to sexual consent.
11. EVALUATING THE CONFLICT: CONSTITUTIONAL
AND POLICY CONCERNS
This Part of the Article discusses both the constitutional violations
and policy problems created by the inconsistent regulation of adolescent
sexuality under statutory rape and parental involvement laws. After
highlighting the substantive due process infringements and public policy
concerns, this Article argues that states should consciously reject the
protectionism-versus-enablement paradigm in the regulation of adoles-
cent sexuality and adopt a more comprehensive and internally-
consistent body of law.
A. Substantive Due Process C/aims.- Undue Burdens
on the Sexually Mature Minor
The substantive due process problem created by conflicting age of
consent and minor abortion restrictions rests on the undue burdens line
71. See infra Table 1 (state-by-state comparison of age of consent versus parental in-
volvement statutes).
72. For a more in-depth discussion of the shifting legal status of adolescents with regard
to abortion law discussed within a greater comparison to the legal status of adoles-
cents to make decisions regarding abortion versus criminal liability see Ehrlich, supra
note 46, at 91. Prof. Ehrlich reflects upon the shifting legal status of a pregnant mi-
nor depending upon her reproductive choice: "Assume for a moment that a young
woman, upon learning she is pregnant, first considers motherhood. Not only is she
free to make this decision on her own, but, by making this choice, she is vested with
adult-like rights with respect to her medical care while pregnant and following the
birth of her child. Now assume that she changes her mind and decides to abort. With
this change her adult status is revoked, and her reproductive choice is instead subject
to an adult involvement requirement."
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of jurisprudence under Casey. The Court's affirmation of parental in-
volvement restrictions for minor abortions should not apply to states
where the age of consent is below the threshold age for parental in-
volvement in minor abortions. More specifically, this Article argues
that the Beilotti and Danforth decisions upholding parental involvement
statutes should only apply where the state retains its legitimate interest
in balancing the rights of immature minors with parental rights.7" States
that have established legal maturity at sixteen have forfeited any parental
interest in those minors' sexual and reproductive decisions above the age
of consent. In taking Casey seriously, the Court should expressly re-
examine parental involvement requirements under an undue burdens
analysis and not under Bel/otti and Danforth. Under the undue burdens
test, parental involvement requirements for legally mature, consenting
minors closely resemble the spousal notification requirements struck
down in Casey and therefore violate minors' substantive due process
abortion rights.
1. Adult Abortion Rights Under Casey: The Undue Burdens Test
Beginning with Roe v. Wade, the Court grounded its recognition of
substantive due process abortion rights in the more general fundamental
right of personal privacy.7 Under Roe, restrictions must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.7 Since Roe,
the Court has continued to decide abortion rights cases according to a
substantive due process analysis, grounded in the fundamental right of
privacy.7 In the 1992 Casey decision, the Court reaffirmed Roe's essential
holding, recognizing a woman's right to an abortion as grounded in her
right to privacy, yet also changed the constitutional test for upholding
that right.7 Specifically, the Court relaxed Roe's strict scrutiny standard
to a new undue burdens analysis .7 9 The undue burdens standard is now
the constitutional test for substantive due process abortion rights. Under
this test undue burdens are those regulations "[having] the purpose or
73. Cazsey was decided in 1992, Beltotti was decided in 1979, and Danforth was decided in
1976.
74. See infra Part II.A.3.
75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
76. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
77. See Helem M. Alvar~, Gonzales v. Carhart: Bringing Abortion Law Back into the
Family Fold, 69 MONT. L. REv. 409, 431 (2008) (describing the substantive due pro-
cess claims as the basis for Roe's holding and its progeny).
78. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77.
79. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77.
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effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus."8 0 In its most recent abortion decisions,
namely Sten berg v. Carhart (2000) and Gonzales v. Carhart (2007), the
Court expressly affirmed its adoption of the undue burdens test as the
standard for abortion rights substantive due process claims."'
2. Minor Abortion Rights Under Beilotti and Danforth
Notwithstanding the undue burdens test for abortion rights gener-
ally, the Court has developed a unique subset of regulatory principles for
minor abortion rights .8  These principles are grounded in concerns
about minors' immaturity and their inability to make important life
decisions without parental support." Most of hs prinilsgvr
permissible restrictions on minor abortion rights through parental in-
volvement requirements. 84 The array of Supreme Court decisions estab-
establishing minor abortion rights precedent spans nearly four decades
and incorporates various the aspects of Court's language from Roe
through its most recent decisions in Stenberg and Carhart.85 Collective-
ly, this set of jurisprudence defines the constitutional parameters of
parental involvement statutes." Most basically, the Court has permitted
parental involvement requirements where there are judicial bypass
mechanisms to allow a minor the opportunity to petition and persuade
a judge that it would be in her best interest, or that she is mature
80. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77.
81. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (holding that a state law prohibit-
ing "partial birth abortion" was unconstitutional under an undue burden analysis);
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (applying the undue burdens test to
the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2007 and explaining that the undue
burdens analysis in Casey rejected and replaced the strict scrutiny standard set forth in
Roe).
82. See infra note 90 (comparing the parental consent statute considered in Danforth to
the parental notification statute addressed in Beliotti). Notably, while the majority of
the minor abortion cases were decided prior to Casey, the Court expressly reasoned in
Casey that parental involvement laws were not inconsistent with the undue burdens
test.
83. See infra note 91 and accompanying text (explaining that Casey was consistent with
the Court's holding in Bellotti and Danforth and that parental involvement require-
ments did not impose an "undue burden" on minot abortion rights).
84. See infra note 9 1.
85. See supra note 81 (describing the Court's decisions in Stenberg and Carhart as new
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enough, to make the abortion decision independently. 7 In Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976), the Court struck
down a law requiring minors seeking an abortion to obtain either paren-
tal consent or physician certification that the abortion was necessary to
protect the young woman's health."' However, in Beilotti v. Baird (1979),
the Court permitted a range of limitations on a minor's abortion right,
including a parental notification requirement, so long as there was a ju-
dicial bypass alternative or equivalent.8 " From the Court's decisions in
Danforth to Bellotti, the availability of judicial bypass emerged as the
dividing line on constitutional restrictions of minor abortion rights.9"
Citing Danforth and Beilotti in Casey, the Court explained, in dicta,
that the prohibition on undue burdens was "in no way inconsistent"
with past decisions upholding parental notification and consent re-
quirements.9 ' Again emphasizing the fundamental immaturity of
children, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of both Danforth and
Beilotti by distinguishing adult abortion rights from minor abortion
rights on the grounds that "minors will benefit from consultation with
their parents and that children will often not realize that their parents
have their best interests at heart."" Thus, even after Casey established
the new undue burdens test for adults, the Court still recognized
Danforth and Bellotti as defining the constitutional contours of minor
93
abortion restrictions.
87. See Daniel K. Fink, Refining Permissible Abortion Regulations: Mandatory In-Person,
Informed Consent Meetings Held Constitutional, but Restriction on Number of Petitions
by Minors for Judicial By-Pass of Parental- Consent Requirement Overturned-
Cincinnati Women's Services, Inc. v. Taft, 33 Am. J.L. & MED. 145 (2007) (analyz-
ing a recent Sixth Circuit decision on minor judicial bypass proceedings in
comparison to the traditional approach to minor judicial bypass).
88. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72.
89. See generally Ohio v. Akcron &enter for Reprod. Health. 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (up-
holding the constitutionality of a law requiring parental notification so long as there
was the option of judicial bypass); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (up-
holding the constitutionality of a parental notification law requiring notice be given
to both parents); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409-11 (198 1) (upholding a pa-
rental notification requirement so long as it did not impose a "blanket unreviewable
veto power of parents" over the daughter's abortion).
90. Compare Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72 (1976)
with Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 622 (1979).
91. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
92. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
93. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997) (citing Bellotti to uphold the
constitutionality of Montana's Parental Notice of Abortion Act where there was a ju-
dicial bypass provision to allow for waiver of the notice requirement where such
notification would not be in the "best interests" of the minor).
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3. The Undue Burden: Statutory Incongruence,
Inconsistency and Irrationality
Of the thirty-four states with active and unenjoined parental in-
volvement statutes, twenty-six states set the age of sexual consent
younger than the age at which a minor may obtain an abortion with-
out parental involvement."4 Where the age of consent is years younger
than the threshold age of a minor female seeking to obtain an abortion
without parental involvement, the privacy right of a minor to legally
consent to sexual intercourse directly conflicts with parental rights in
child-rearing. The law's dependence upon the protectionism-versus-
enablement paradigm inadvertently creates a statutory scheme where
minor sexual enablement directly clashes with parental protectionism.
The resulting statutory framework is legally incongruous, inconsistent,
and irrational; most states establish sexual maturity for the purposes of
consenting to intercourse and bearing a child at sixteen, but then restrict
a minor's right to obtain an unencumbered abortion until eighteen."5
Ultimately these restrictions violate the substantive due process rights of
legally consenting minors and fail to pass muster under Casey's undue
burden analysis."6
The vesting of a minor's sexual consent capacity triggers the corre-
sponiding protection of that minor's privacy rights and seriously
challenges the applicability of the immaturity justification for parental
involvement.9 17 The state acknowledges minor maturity at the age of con-
sent by formally recognizing the ability to consent to, engage in, and
reproduce as a result of, lawful sexual intercourse. Correspondingly,
when a minor reaches the age of consent, the state concedes the expira-
tion of its immaturity interest under Bellotti and is bound to the more
stringent undue burdens standard for mature women's abortion rights.9 "
The substantive due process issue arises from the state's forfeiture of its
legitimate government interest in restricting minor abortion rights
where it has already established the threshold for minor sexual and re-
productive maturity at the age of legal consent.9 9 Under Casey's undue
94. 28 of 35 states currently have active parental involvement laws. See supra Part I.C.
95. See Ehrlich, stupra note 46, at 85 (explaining the differential treatment of minor abor-
tion rights vis- -vis parental rights).
96. This conflict may also raise significant state constitutional concerns. However this
portion of the Article is focused solely upon addressing substantive due process
claims.
97. See general/v Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
98. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
99. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
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burden analysis, parental involvement requirements, absent the immatu-
rity justification, more closely resemble the spousal notification and
consent statutes struck down as unconstitutional in both Danforth00 and
Belotti.'0 ' The Court in Casey expressly addressed the difference between
parental and spousal notification requirements. It explained that "mi-
nors will benefit from consultation with their parents" (presumably in a
way that is different from the way a wife would benefit from consulta-
tion with her husband) and that "children will often not realize that
their parents have their best interests at heart." The palpable difference,
in the Court's eyes, between parental notification and spousal notifica-
tion was minor child immaturity.1
0 2
In Casey, the Court defined an "undue burden" as any state regula-
tion having the "purpose or effect of placing substantial obstacle in path
of woman who seeks abortion of nonviable fetus."'0 3 Although never
expressly defined, the Court's characterization of an "undue burden"' in
Casey has generally been interpreted as any "regulation [that would] pre-
vent women from receiving an abortion."T M Without the immaturity
rationale to justify parental involvement, parental notification and con-
sent regulations impose an undue burden for many of the same reasons
as spousal notification provisions, leaving the minor exposed to the risk
of: 1) physical reprimand and punishment by parents; 2) financial ostra-
cization and withdrawal of economic support; 3) psychological abuse
and intimidation by family and peers; 4) actual intervention by a parent
to prevent a child from obtaining an abortion.' 5 Further, many scholars
have criticized parental involvement and judicial bypass requirements as
having an indefensibly chilling effect on minor abortion rights. ' 6 These
scholars argue that such requirements prevent many minors from ever
even seeking abortions and so complicate the minor abortions that do
occur so that they cannot be obtained without significant difficulty,
danger, and Cost. 0
100. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-69.
101. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 6 2 2 .
102. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
103. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
104. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES 830
(3rd ed. 2006) (characterizing the Court's interpretation of the undue burdens test).
105. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 894. See generally Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in
the United States: Politics and Policy, 18 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 305 (2004); J. Sho-
shanna Ehrlich, Journey Through the Courts: Minors, Abortion and the Quest for
Reproductive Fairness, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (1998); David Crary, New Laws to
Boost Hearings in Court, CJ ONLINE (July 31, 2000), http://cjonline.coml
StorIes/073 1 00/new-hearings.shtml (quoting J. Shoshanna Ehrlich).
106. See Sanger, supra note 105, at 3 10.
107. See id.
Vol. 17:271288
2011] WHEN SIXTEEN AIN'T SO SWEET28
Considering the inapplicability of the immaturity rationale to mi-
nors over the age of consent, Casey's undue burdens analysis and not the
Beilotti and Danforth decisions ought to govern these minors' abortion
rights. Without the immaturity rationale to distinguish legally consent-
ing minor abortion rights from adult abortion rights, the test for
permissible government restrictions on abortions becomes much more
stringent.'O Pa rental involvement laws for legally consenting minors are
undue burdens because they arbitrarily require either parental invasions
of minor privacy or additional subjective judicial evaluations of maturity
before an abortion can be obtained.' 09 The state cannot rationally main-
tain its legitimate interest in intruding upon a minor's privacy-based
right to an abortion where it has already recognized that minor's sexual
maturity. The substantive due process standard for legally-consenting
minors should therefore be Casey's adult undue burdens analysis, and
under such an analysis the imposition of parental involvement does, in
fact, "Place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion.""
B. Policy Concerns
The substantive due process claim caused by the conflicting ages of
maturity in statutory rape and parental involvement laws demands
change. However, the public policy concerns arising from this conflict
should control the scope and shape of this change. Because this Article
locates the constitutional conflict within a greater faulty paradigm, poli-
cy is particularly important in developing a solution that addresses both
the specific substantive due process issue as and the greater systemic
108. In City ofAkron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), a
pre-Casey decision, the Court struck down an Ohio parental consent statute asun
constitutional because "the statute made no provision for a mature or emancipated
minor completely to avoid hostile parental involvement by demonstrating to the sat-
isfaction of the court that she was capable of exercising her constitutional right to
choose an abortion." There, the statute was deemed unconstitutional as applied to all
mature minors. Thus, although technically overruled by Casey there is some precedent
to indicate that maturity distinctions ought to further distinguish immature minor
abortion rights from mature minor abortion rights. Jared H. Jones, Annotation,
Women's Reproductive Rights Concerning Abortion, and Governmental Regulation
Thereof-Supreme Court Cases, 20 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2007) (§ 27: Validity ofparticu-
.1ar parental notification provisions-Held unconstitutional). To date there has yet to be
any Supreme Court case that explicitly addresses the abortion rights of mature minors
versus immature minors under Casey's undue burdens analysis.
109. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
110. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
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flaws. This Article presents five policy problems directly caused by the
inconsistent treatment of sexually active minors under conflicting age of
consent and parental involvement laws: 1) the encouragement of impul-
sive minor sexual activity; 2) the linkage of reproductive decisional
autonomy to pregnancy outcome; 3) the promotion of paternalism and
gender stereotypes toward minor females; 4) the punishment of sexually
active minor females through parental involvement and judicial bypass;
and 5) the inhibition of parent-child communication about sexuality
and reproductive decisions before a minor becomes sexually active. Ul-
timately, the policy concerns presented here, coupled with the
constitutional violations previously addressed, guide the discussion of
solutions presented in Part 111.
1. Ambiguous Legal Identities Encourage Impulsive Behaviors
By divorcing responsibility for reproductive autonomy from sexual
maturity, inconsistent sexual consent and parental involvement statutes
promote impulsive sexual activity. Rather than basing sexual and repro-
ductive rights upon the obtainment of a single legal marker, the current
statutory scheme separates sexual consent capacity from reproductive
decisional autonomy. More specifically, the law currently recognizes ma-
turity for the purposes of coital consent but then rescinds that
acknowledgment when a minor seeks an abortion. The conceptual sev-
erance of sexual consent from reproductive autonomy encourages
minors to consider their decision to have sex within a vacuum, as sepa-
rate and distinct from the risks and consequences of that decision.
Without linking the ability to consent to sexual activity to the ability to
independently terminate pregnancy, the law sanctions impulsive, short-
sighted sexual consent decision-making among minors.
2. Minor Reproductive Rights Turn On Pregnancy Outcome
Inconsistent sexual consent and parental involvement statutes link
reproductive decisional capacity to pregnancy outcome."' If a pregnant
minor elects to carry a pregnancy to term, she may make that decision
independent of her parents and may consent to reproductive and pre-
natal healthcare without any parental notification or support whatsoev-
er."12 In fact, in many states a minor may consent to medical care and
I111. See Ehrlich, supra note 72, at 90.
112. See id'.
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pre-natal services even below the age of sexual consent without initially
having to obtain parental notification and consent."' Effectively, the
minor is "[vested] with adult-like rights when the decision is to become
a mother, but [denied] them... .when the decision is to avoid (or perhaps
postpone) motherhood."'" The law therefore trusts pregnant minors to
responsibly, maturely, and independently carry a pregnancy to term but
distrusts their ability seek an abortion without parental involvement.
3. Parental Involvement Requirements Reinforce
Stereotypes and Paternalism
Subjecting a legally-consenting, sexually-mature minor female to
parental involvement requirements reinforces a paternalistic legal system
and traditional gender stereotypes. The legally-consenting minor female
is endowed with the right to consent to sex, pregnancy, medical care,
and/or raising a child but prevented from independently choosing to
terminate or postpone her "childbearing" role. Indeed, these require-
ments also serve to normalize the notion that child-bearing is the
inherent and natural purpose of sex. These statutory inconsistencies un-
dermine women's autonomy and personal dignity. They serve to
reinforce a paternalistic vision of the law as protecting immature minor
women, except where maturity is obtained through the acceptance of
pregnancy and motherhood. Where the consenting minor rejects
motherhood, she forfeits her claim to maturity and is required to in-
volve her parents in her abortion decision. These policy implications
are consistent with general trends in abortion jurisprudence in the wake
of both Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart, but most
pointedly affect the sexual and reproductive autonomy of minor fe-
males."' This paternalistic-protectionist understanding of abortion
rights vis- -vis a woman's proper role as a mother undermine minor fe-
male dignity by basing such reproductive decisional autonomy on
113. While there may be reporting requirements regarding evidence of statutory rape or
sexual abuse, a minor's reproductive autonomy in deciding to carry the pregnancy it-
self is not pre-conditioned upon initial parental notification and/or consent. For a
description of statutory rape reporting requirements and limitations, see U.S. DEPT.
op HEALTH AND Hum. SERV., STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND RE-
PORTING REQUIREMENTS (2004).
114. See Ehrlich, supra note 72, at 90.
115. Reva Siegel argues that the Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart reflects an
increasingly paternalistic tendency to regulate abortion rights on the basis of a fun-
damentally protectionist approach regarding what a woman's personal sense of
"digniry" should look like. See Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abor-
tion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1705 (2008).
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"stereotypical assumptions about women's capacities and women's
roles."' 16 Most basically, if a minor female elects to carry a pregnancy to
term she is fulfilling her natural role of "woman as child bearer" and she
is rewarded with adult, decision-making abilities. Yet if a minor female
seeks to terminate her pregnancy, she is refusing the stereotype of "wom-
an as child bearer" and consequently, presumed so immature as to
require either parental or judicial approval of her decision.
4. Parental Involvement and Judicial Bypass Serve
More to Punish Than to Protect
Requiring minor females who have legally consented to sex to ob-
tain parental notification, consent or judicial bypass effectively punishes
minor females for having sex, rather than encouraging responsible sexual
activity.' 7 Parental involvement statutes, even with judicial bypass provi-
sions, exemplify a reactive, rather than preventative, approach to both
minor sex and teenage pregnancy. Instead of conditioning the legal
recognition of a minor's ability to consent to sexual activity and repro-
ductive procedures (contraception, reproductive care, abortion, etc.)
upon an initial demonstration of maturity, the state first presumes legal
maturity for the purposes of having sex, and then reacts to the immature
consequences of sex (unintended pregnancy) by requiring either parental
involvement or judicial bypass to terminate a pregnancy. The minor is
thus forced to either "own up" to her sexual irresponsibility by having to
obtain parental notification, consent or judicial bypass for an abortion
OR "take responsibility" for her pregnancy by carrying it to term. Be-
cause of her decision to seek an abortion, the minor female is
particularly punished. She has two options: (1) seek the involvement of
her parents and risk "being rejected [by her family], kicked out of the
family home, or punished physically" or (2) petition a judge and subject
herself to an inquisition of her purported "maturity" in which she is ex-
pected to provide information about "her grades and after-school jobs"
as well as why she has chosen to circumvent the guidance of her par-
ents. 11 Ironically, parental involvement and judicial bypass requirements
compel minor females to demonstrate their maturity in a moment of
116. Supra note 115.
117. For a persuasive analysis of judicial bypass and parental involvement statutes as pun-
ishments, see Sanger, supra note 105, at 314 (describing the "ordeal" of judicial
bypass as "humiliating, risky, intrusive" and "properly understood as punishment").
118. See Sanger, supra note 105, at 311-12 (discussing parental involvement and judicial
bypass processes as "punishment" for minor sex).
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crisis, a time at which most adult women would be challenged to put on
a level-headed display of maturity.
5. The Hystericization of Adolescent Sexuality
The fragmented statutory treatment of sexual consent and minor
abortion rights inhibits parent-child communication and reinforces a
general hysteria about adolescent sexuality. A minor's right to consent to
sex is implicitly created by statutory rape statutes that conceive of ado-
lescent sexuality as independent from reproductive rights. Minor
consensual sex above the age of consent is legally permissible but socially
uncomfortable. Thus, a minor's decision to have sex is allowed to be
made in private once she has reached the age of consent, with as little or
as much parental support and/or intervention as deemed necessary by
that minor. This reflects the law's great discomfort in acknowledging
sexual development and exploration amongst adolescents."' Indeed, un-
til the minor gets "caught" through the incident of pregnancy for her
sexual activity, the law shrouds minor sexuality in dark, protective priva-
cy. This sense of sexual privacy is fragmented, illusory, and socially
harmful to minors. It inhibits minors from openly discussing sexuality
with their parents before undertaking the risks of sexual activity, but
then forces them to disclose their sexual irresponsibility to their parents
if they seek an abortion. Ironically, this disjointed scheme undermines the
state's mandate in Title X of the Public Health Service Act to "encourage
parent-child communication" regarding family planning services for
sexually active minors.1
2 0
These concerns all reflect the problematic dichotomy of protec-
tionism-versus-enablement in the regulation of adolescent sexuality. By
separating minor consent capacity from protectionist parental
119. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION
Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1978) (exploring the growth of dis-
course surrounding sexuality, particularly pathologizing early sexual play and
childhood sexual development); see also R. Danielle Egan & Gail Hawkes, Producing
the Prurient Through the Pedagogy of Purity: Child~hood Sexuality and the Social Purity
Movement, 20 J. HIST. SOCIOL. 443 (2007) (exploring the historical construction of
childhood sexuality and the development of purity-focused hysteria surrounding
childhood sexual play and development beginning in the Victorian era).
120. See generally Rachel K. Jones, Do U.S. Family Planning Clinics Encourage Parent-Child
Communication? Findings from an Exploratory Survey, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL
AND REPROD. HEALTH 155 (2006), http://guttmacher.org/pubs/psrh/fuUl/
3815506.pdf (examining trends in reproductive health clinics regarding promoting
parent-child communication in sexual and reproductive decision-making and the
conditioning of federal funds upon the promotion of parent-child communication).
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involvement requirements, the state sanctions short-sighted, impulsive
minor sexual decision-making. The prorectionism-versus-enablement
paradigm links decisional capacity to pregnancy outcome rather than to
actual developmental maturity. By invoking a protectionist mindset, the
state holds hostage a minor's reproductive future without regard for her
sexual dignity. Indeed, this paternalistic protectionism allows both par-
ents and the courts to procedurally punish minors when they are caught
having sex in the form of an unintended pregnancy. Ultimately, the pro-
tectionism-versus-enablement paradigm undermines the potential for
parent-child communication and shared decision-making before a mi-
nor's initial choice to become sexually active. To free jurisdictions from
the prorectionist-versus-enablement stranglehold, this Article next artic-
ulates a new framework, the MCC status proposal, that would reconcile
the constitutional and policy concerns raised here through the compre-
hensive sexual regulatory reform for minors.
111. BEYOND PROTECTIONISM-VERSUS-ENABLEMENT: RETHINKING THE
REGULATION OF ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY THROUGH
EDUCATION AND LiCENSURE
The legal quandary created by incongruous age of consent and
parental involvement laws demonstrates the defective regulation of
adolescent sexuality under the prorecrionist-versus-enablement dichot-
omy. Specifically, this conflict illustrates how the flawed paradigm
produces a legal scheme that both infringes upon minors' substantive
due process rights and constructs poor public policy. This Part begins by
examining and ultimately rejecting possible solutions to this conflict
through statutory reform and certain status exceptions. In particular,
this Part argues that while status exceptions'12' and statutory reform may
address the singular legal conflict between age of consent and parental
involvement laws, these remedies still preserve the problematic schema
of protecrionism-versus-enablement. Addressing the inconsistent regula-
tion of adolescent sexuality on such a piecemeal basis therefore would
only serve to further reify the dichotomized legal landscape. In response
to the systemic shortcomings of such solutions, this Part outlines an in-
novative new framework to regulate adolescent sexuality, combining
components of education and licensure, designed to reconcile the par-
ticular constitutional and policy problems outlined above and to escape
121. See infra Part 11I.13. (describing "status-based" exceptions as either "mature minor" or
"1emancipated minor" exceptions to the parental notification and consent require-
ments).
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from greater systemic paradigm. By implementing a comptehensive,
cooperative, and anticipatory model, the proposed consent capacity
framework would create a more consistent system for the regulation of
adolescent sexuality.
A. The Inability of Statutory Reform to Resolve Systemic Shortcomings
Perhaps the most instinctive solution to address the conflict be-
tween age of consent and parental involvement laws would be to amend
the laws so that the age of consent matches the age at which an adoles-
cent may independently obtain an abortion. Such reforms would
involve either lowering the age at which a minor could obtain an abor-
tion to the age of consent (likely between fourteen and sixteen) or
raising the age of sexual consent to the age of majority (eighteen). Given
the current trends in abortion law and the robust tradition of parental
rights, it seems highly unlikely that states would look favorably upon
lowering the age at which a minor may obtain an abortion without pa-
rental involvement. Because such reform would do little to adjust the
pitting of adolescent autonomy against parental rights, states would like-
ly face significant opposition if they were to attempt to reduce parental
power and increase adolescent abortion rights. Given the general hostili-
ty of states toward the deregulation of adolescent sexuality,2 this section
focuses on states' more probable attempts to reconcile this statutory con-
flict by increasing the legal age of consent for minors.
Admittedly, raising the age of consent to the threshold age for adult
abortion rights would neutralize the constitutional concerns previously
discussed because the state would maintain its rational interest in the
regulation of adolescent sexuality until the age of eighteen. 12 ' By retain-
ing this legal interest until the age of majority, the immaturity rationale
would still apply to justify the more restrictive regulation of minor abor-
tion rights. At the absolute least, there would be a conceptual parity
between the state's recognition of a minor's sexual consent and reproduc-
tive maturity.
Despite the formal reconciliation of the constitutional concerns of-
fered by such statutory reforms, raising the age of consent to eighteen to
match parental involvement laws' would result in poor public policy and
the unrealistic criminalization of adolescent sexuality altogether. Studies
indicate that nearly three of every ten teens between the ages of thirteen
122. Seegenerally Ehrlich, supra note 105; Siegel, supra note 115.
123. See supra Part Nl.A. (discussing a rational basis analysis for substantive due process
abortion claims).
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and sixteen is already sexually active. 1'Every year, almost 750,000 teen-
age women between the ages of fifteen and nineteen become pregnant.12
Indeed, about a third of adolescent females become pregnant before the
age of twenty at least once.12 6 The median age at first intercourse is 16.9
for adolescent males and 17.4 for adolescent females.12' The criminaliza-
tion of sexual activity for adolescents under the age of eighteen would
likely have disastrous effects on sexually active teens . It would overflow
the courts with criminal underage sexual activity for the sake of legal
formalism, virtually ensuring widespread jury nullification and under-
mining the systemic regulation of adolescent sexuality altogether.
If states were to raise the legal age of consent to eighteen for the
purposes of statutory consistency, this would also likely impact the will-
ingness of underage teens to seek out contraceptives, STI treatments and
reproductive care for fear of legal consequences. In a 2006 article, the
Gurrmacher Institute found that existing legal and educational prohibi-
tions on teenage sexuality, such as abstinence-only education programs,
abstinence pledges, and restricted access to contraceptives and reproduc-
tive care, proved "ineffective in delaying the initiation of sexual
activity."12 1 Moreover, the same study found that there was significant
evidence that "such programming . .. may be making it harder for
young people to effectively engage in protective behaviors down the
road."'12 1 In attempting to obligate teens to practice abstinence, these
programs may have inadvertently promoted furtive sexuality and risky
sexual practices.
Statutory reform might resolve the formal conflict between age of
consent and parental involvement laws, but it would do so at an unjusti-
fiable cost to public health and society. Systemically, it still fails to fully
reconcile the needs, responsibilities, and capabilities of the developmen-
tally dynamic adolescent vis- i-vis her parents and the state. Therefore,
this Article next considers more progressive alternatives, focusing on
124. See Ana Maria Arumi, Nearly 3 in 10 Young Teens "Sexually Active," MSNBC.com
(January 31, 2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.comlidl6839072.
125. ALAN GuTrmACHER INST., U.S. TEENAGE PREGNANCY STATISTICS NATIONAL AND
STATE TRENDS AND TRENDS By RACE AND ETHNICITY (2006), available at http:ll
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/state-Pregnancy-trends.pdf.
126. See HENRY J. KAISER FAm. FOUND., U.S. TEEN SExuAL AcTV rY (Jan. 2005), available
at http://www.kff.org/youthhivstds/upload/U-S-Teen-Sexual-Acivity-Fact-Sheet.pdf
(analyzing trends in sexual activity amongst high school aged students in public and
private schools, between the 9th and 12th grades).
127. Ehrlich, supra note 72.
128. See ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., Legislating Against Arousal' The Growing Divide Be-
tween Federal Policy and Teenage Sexual Behavior, 9 GUTTFMACHER POL'Y Ritv. 3, 14-
15 (2006).
129. Supra note 128.
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status exceptions and objective demonstrations of minor maturity, to
disentangle future policy from the protectionism-versus-enablement
paradigm.
B. Constitutional Violations anti Policy Concerns
Persist with Status Exemptions
Beyond the judicial bypass mechanism required under Danforth
and Bellotti, a few states also recognize status exceptions to parental in-
volvement requirements based upon categorical qualifications like
marriage, military service, emancipation, and/or maturity' 3 0 These ex-
ceptions would allow an already-pregnant minor to obtain an abortion
without parental involvement where the minor is legally married, en-
rolled in the military or legally emancipated. Legal emancipation
requires that the petitioning minor does not live with her parents and is
economically and personally self-sufficient.'"' Legal emancipation is also
granted where a minor's parents officially have surrendered their parental
duties and rights. 132 Emancipation is largely determined by financial in-
dependence and control rather than psychosocial indicators of
developmental maturity."
A few states also recognize a "mature minor" status exemption to al-
low a minor to independently consent to medical procedures where she
has proven herself to be "mature enough to understand the risks and
benefits of [the] proposed medical treatment to give consent."' Unlike
emancipation, the mature minor exception is based upon developmental
competence rather than financial independence. However, even in the
states that currently recognize the "mature minor" exemption for medi-
cal procedures in general, the exception may in fact be illusory in the
130. See Ehrlich, supra note 72, at 88 (describing status exceptions and maturity exemp-
tions for minor abortions); Jennifer L. Rosato, Let's Get Real: A Principled Approach to
Adolescent Empowerment in Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 769,
776 (2002) (describing status exceptions generally).
131. See supra note 72, at 88-89.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See supra note 72, at 89 (highlighting an example of a mature minor exemption from
Arkansas that reads: "[a]ny unemancipated minor of sufficient intelligence to under-
stand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment
or procedures' may consent to his or her own medical care").
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context of abortions, as it is often pre-empted by specific parental in-
volvement requirements for minor abortions."'5
As a logical extension of the mature minor status exemption, one
possible way to reconcile the age of consent and parental involvement
laws would be to use anticipatory status exceptions in addition to the
post-pregnancy judicial bypass option. Here, states would be required
not only to ensure a post-pregnancy judicial bypass option for "imma-
ture" minors (minors under the legal age of consent) but also to require
11mature minor" provisions for those adolescent females above the age of
legal consent but under the age of majority. In accordance with a truly
robust mature minor provision, a minor who reached the age of sexual
consent would have the ability to petition the court to obtain "mature
minor" status before ever becoming pregnant, based on a qualitative
demonstration of her maturity. Once obtained, this "mature minor" sta-
tus would recognize the legal right of that minor to consent to medical
procedures, including abortions.
The most innovative characteristic of this reformed status exemp-
tion would be the ability of a minor to obtain the status declaration
before pregnancy. The preemptive quality of this proposed mature minor
exception would serve two primary functions: 1) to equalize the medical
rights of minors both carrying a pregnancy to term and obtaining an
abortion; and 2) to eliminate the mental, physical, and emotional dan-
gers of additional notification/consent requirements where time may be
of the essence.
Despite the social and individual benefits of such a mature minor
exception, it would still fail to fully reconcile the constitutional viola-
tions and policy concerns outlined above. Ultimately it would work to
preserve the flawed protectionist-versus-enablement paradigm and likely
be criticized for creating new, additional policy problems. First, preemp-
tive status exemptions would likely be criticized for unduly clogging the
courts. Second, given the unplanned quality of most teenage pregnan-
cies, 136 a mechanism that would require a great amount of additional
forethought, planning, and extra-preventative steps would likely not be
very useful. Third, the notion of the status exception still constructs the
typical, consenting minor as presumptively immature. Fourth, theex
135. See Oberman, supra note 41, at 149 (analyzing the mature minor exemption and
concluding "the bulk of the legal analysis and focus is cast 'not in terms of protecting
minors, but in recognizing independent rights of parents.'")
136. See AL.AN GUTTMACHER INST., IN BRIEF: FACTS ON AmERiCAN TEENS' SEXUAL AND
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.guttmacher.orgl
pubs/fb...ATSRH.pdf (explaining that over 82% of U.S. teenage pregnancies are un-
planned).
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ception reinforces the divorce of meaningful sexual consent from repro-
ductive maturity and autonomy. Thus, although status exceptions might
encourage more consequential thinking by some sexually active minors,
they are trapped within the protection ism-versus-enablement paradigm,
pitting the autonomy of consenting minors against the paternalism of
both the state and their parents.
C. Licensing Minor Consent Capacity (MCC) Status
Under the pro tectionism-versus-enablemen t paradigm, the afore-
mentioned reforms would still fail to promote healthy, developmentally-
appropriate, and socially responsible adolescent sexual behavior. Options
to reform the existing law, either by raising the age of sexual consent or
lowering the age at which a minor may obtain an abortion without pa-
rental involvement, do nothing to address the public policy failings of
current sexual and reproductive rights law and would only serve to reaf-
firm this flawed system.' 7 Indeed, even preemptive status exceptions
would remain entrenched in the protectionist versus enablement polari-
ty by constructing legally-consenting minors as sexually mature but
unworthy of full reproductive autonomy.1
3 8
Under any of these schemes, the decisional autonomy of sexually
active minors remains pitted against a paternalistic protector (either the
state or the parent). Sexually active minors are pre-constructed to under-
stand their sexual identities and practices as in conflict with adult
intervenors. 3 3' For this reason, the continued application of protectionist
and enabling measures to regulate adolescent sexuality is detrimental to
the promotion of a healthy, holistic view of adolescent sexuality.
In furtherance of a comprehensive and consistent legal framework
for the regulation of adolescent sexuality, this Article advocates aban-
doning the fragmented approach of protectionism-versus-enablement.
In the place of the current incoherent system, this Article proposes a
new regulatory framework grounded in a necessary parity between sexu-
al autonomy and reproductive responsibility. More specifically: (1) to
facilitate better early communication between adolescents and their par-
ents regarding sexual and reproductive decision-making; (2) to formally
recognize and promote sexual maturity through education and legal
137. See infra Part 1IIB.
138. See supra note 137.
1 39. See Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master's House: Of Protection, Patriarchy and the
Potential/or Using the Masters Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 DEPAUL L.
Ruv. 799, 803 (2001) (describing the regulation of adolescent sexuality through stat-
utory rape laws as originating in protectionism and patriarchy).
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consensual capacity; and (3) to promote consequential, prevention-
oriented, socially-responsible adolescent sexual behavior, this Article
proposes a new regulatory framework consisting of comprehensive sexu-
al education and consent licensure. By conditioning legal consensual
capacity upon education and objective assessment, states would con-
struct a comprehensive way to regulate both adolescent sexuality and
reproductive rights. This system moves beyond protectionism-versus-
enablement by simultaneously encouraging shared parent-child-state
cooperation and communication, while also using education to promote
and assess sexual maturity and socially-responsible behaviors.
D. MCC Status: Promoting Sexual Responsibility
Thro ugh Minor Consent Licensure
This Article envisions a comprehensive regulatory system of minor
sexuality that conditions a minor's ability to consent to sex and repro-
ductive procedures upon the successful completion of an education
program and a qualitative assessment. This system would explicitly link
a minor's consensual capacity to an objective understanding of the con-
sequences and risks of sexual activity, including knowledge of pregnancy,
STIs, abortion procedures, adoption programs, etc. Conceptually, a mi-
nor's consensual capacity for both sex and reproductive procedures
would flow directly from her understanding of sexual and reproductive
health. Minor consent capacity would be conditioned upon an objective
assessment of maturity and knowledge. In such a system, states would
construct a sexual education and licensure program, to be available both
in public schools as well as through private institutions (not unlike pri-
vate driving schools), in which minors would first enroll in a sexual
education course, and then have the option to seek legal "consent" status
by passing a sexual education test. Thus, the legal recognition of minor
consent capacity (hereinafter referred to as "MCC status") would be
akin to obtaining a license, conditioned upon the demonstration of sex-
ual and reproductive health knowledge. For minors between the ages of
fourteen and eighteen, the legal recognition of meaningful sexual con-
sent would turn on MCC status. Upon the age of majority (eighteen
years in most states), both sexual and reproductive consensual capacity
would become automatic and MCC status would become unnecessary.
300 [Vol. 17:271
2011] WHEN SIXTEEN AIN'T SO SWEET30
1. Proposal Specifications
Procedurally, states would pass legislation both amending statutory
rape laws to recognize the initial age of MCC status eligibility, and also
indicating a second age, presumably the age of majority, at which
consensual capacity would become automatic.4 0 The purpose of the
proposal is to create a legal system that matches the formal recognition
of consensual capacity with some objective qualitative assessment of de-
velopmental sexual maturity in minors. Until reaching the age of
majority, minor status would trigger a presumption of immaturity,
which could be overcome by a qualitative assessment (consent license).
Minors with MCC status would be presumed "legally mature" for con-
sent purposes and therefore could not be victims of statutory rape.
Attainment of the age of majority would trigger a shift in the presump-
tion, from immaturity to maturity. Once a person has reached the age of
majority, the legal presumption of mature consensual capacity would
only be able to be overcome by some traditional demonstration of inca-
pacity (mental illness, insanity, intoxication, etc.)."
Like a driver's license, MCC status would be granted upon comple-
tion of an educational program and successful passage of an objective
exam. The state-regulated MCC assessment exam would be offered at
the end of the educational program and administered by the program
workers. Both successful completion of the MCC educational program
and passage of the exam would be required for a minor to obtain MCC
status. Any minor seeking MCC status who did not initially pass the
exam but had completed the MCC education program could re-take the
exam until passage. Upon successful completion of both requirements, a
minor could register for MCC status with the State Health Department.
States would be free to determine whether MCC status registration
would be granted automatically or whether an additional registration
step by the minor would be required. The Health Department would
retain a database of active MCC status minors that reproductive care
providers would be required to check when working with minors who
are seeking treatment or advice without parental notification, consent,
140. See generally 75 C.J.S. Rape § 57 (20 10). Retaining the presumption of consensual
capacity at the age of majority ensures that the consensual capacity licensure program
for minors could not he used by states as a tool for discrimination and/or eugenics
amongst adults.
14 1. Supra note 140.
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or judicial bypass, depending upon the particularities of the state stat-
142
ute.
Because MCC status operates on the fundamental premise that the
regulation of adolescent sexuality ought to facilitate consequentialist
thinking about sexual decision-making, the educational program is the
primary component of the MCC proposal. States with MCC schemes
would be responsible for designing program curricula to serve as the
parameters for MCC status educators and providers. The curriculum
would focus on promoting healthy and responsible sexual/reproductive
decision-making through communication (with parents guardians, med-
ical professionals and sexual partners), 1 4 3 prevention, contraception,
regular health screenings, full disclosure of reproductive procedures,
etc.14 4 The primary venue for MCC education programs would be
school sexual education programs. Districts seeking state funding for
their sexual education programs would therefore have to comply with
the basic requirements of the MCC program curricula and maintain
current MCC program certification. For students enrolled in MCC-
certified schools, the MCC education course would be offered as the
compulsory sexual education program and successful passage of the edu-
142. This database would also be available to prosecutors considering charges in statutory
rape cases.
143. The communication unit is a fundamental unit of this proposal for both conceptual
and practical (funding) purposes. Conceptually speaking, the proposal has the poten-
tial to displace parents from involvement in the sexual and reproductive decision
making of their children who have obtained MCC status. The communication com-
ponent of the proposal works to offset this risk by using education to help minors
better communicate in advance of unplanned pregnancy and/or sexual crisis. Practi-
cally speaking, Title X of the Federal Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 300 et
seq.), the only piece of federal legislation dedicated solely to family planning, was
amended in 1981 to require that "to the extent practical" grantees of federal funding
"encourage family participation in the decision of minors to seek family planning ser-
vices." Because federal support of state educational programs would largely fund this
proposal, this communication component is a significant piece of the proposal.
144. One potential resource for states in this curriculum design would likely be SIECUS,
the Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States. SIECUS
publishes Guidelines for Comprehensive Sexuality Regulation: Kindergaren- I2th
Grade (recognized as the leading national model for curriculum development in
comprehensive sexual education in the United States) as well as numerous annual
reports on current trends in comprehensive sexual education. The SIECUS model
curriculum consists of six "key concepts": (1) Human Development ("characterized
by the interrelationship between physical, emotional, social and intellectual
growth."); (2) Relationships; (3) Personal/Interpersonal Skills; (4) Sexual Behavior;
(5) Sexual Health; and (6) Sexuality and Culture. For more information see
SIECUS, GUIDELINES FOR COMPRE~HENSIVE SEXUALITY REGULATION:
KINDERGARTEN-12TH- GRADE (3rd Ed. 2004), available at http://www.siecus.orgl
-data/global/images/guidelines.pdf.
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cational program would therefore be required for graduation. Im-
portantly, successful passage of the MCC educational course for school
credit would be separate from passage of the MCC status exam for state
registry purposes. In no way would school credit or graduation be con-
tingent upon actual attainment of MCC status and registry with the
state. Further, parents would not be provided with "opt out" provisions
for children in schools with MCC sexual education programs because
such "opt out" provisions would effectively allow parents to circumvent
the entire MCC scheme and unilaterally prohibit their children from
seeking MCC status."
To ensure access for home schooled minors, for minors attending
schools that either declined or failed to comply with state MCC certifi-
cation requirements, and for minors that may have dropped out of
school, alternative MCC status programs would be offered through both
public and private agencies with MCC certification. This model would
be similar to models of drivers education programs offered across the
states and would serve to ensure that MCC certification be available to
all socioeconomic demographics. Potential alternative venues would in-
clude Planned Parenthood organizations, teen clinics, health insurance
agencies, general healthcare providers (presumably adolescent pediatri-
cians, gynecologists/obstetricians, and some general practitioners), and
privately-owned MCC schools. Importantly, any alternative provider of
MCC education courses would be required to comply with state guide-
lines and strict standard requirements for program certification to ensure
statewide consistency. While these alternative venues would be required
to match MCC program "course hours," they would have some discre-
tion as to the period over which the MCC education program would be
offered and additional services provided. Some alternative MCC educa-
tion programs would offer weekend-long MCC educational "seminars"
to minimize disruption and time constraints placed on minors seeking
MCC status outside their schools. Other medically-affiliated programs
145. Although absolute, the refusal to grant an opt-out provision for parents is essential to
the internal consistency of the proposed statutory scheme and necessary to move laws
regulating adolescent sexuality out of the protectionism-versus-enablement paradigm.
Importantly, the proposal is similar to compulsory sexual education programs, which
have been repeatedly upheld by several federal and state courts across the United
States. See generally Laurent B. Frantz, Validity of Sex Education Programs in Public
Schools, 82 A.L.R. 3d 579 (2008) (in § 3[b] describing compulsory sexual education
programs without parental opt-our provisions held to be valid, citing Davis v. Page,
385 F. Supp. 395 (D.C. N.H. 1974); Cornwell v. State Board of Educ., 314 F. Supp.
340 (D.C. Md. 1969); Hopkins v. Hamden Board of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397
(Conn. 1971)).
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might choose to bundle additional services with their course enrollment,
such as access to HPV vaccination services or STI screening.
Thus, while it is likely that most of these alternative low-cost ven-
ues would receive some form of public funding and/or be joined with
other, larger reproductive and sexual healthcare providers (such as
Planned Parenthood), it is also possible that private programs could seek
MCC status certification and charge tuition. Private third-parry provid-
ers could include private healthcare practices, health insurance
companies, and local youth organizations. Ideally, these programs would
be selected by parents and minor children together, nor unlike enroll-
ment in private driving schools, in conjunction with a comprehensive
healthcare program and other supportive services for responsible sexual
health practices. The opportunity for private, third-party vendors to of-
fer MCC education and status programs would further facilitate parent-
child communication regarding application for MCC status (as tuition
for program enrollment would likely be covered by parents). It would
also allow vendors to provide insurance and healthcare incentives de-
pending upon MCC status registry. Indeed, it could even be used to
manage more comprehensive sexual health care coverage throughout a
minor's sexual decision-making process. Importantly, state regulation of
foundational MCC program curricula would ensure uniformity
amongst public and private MCC status programs.
According to this proposal, minors would have three primary
venues from which they could obtain MCC education and status:
(1) state-certified MCC status programs offered through publicly-funded
school sexual education programs; (2) low or no-cost, stare-subsidized
MCC status sexual education seminars; and (3) private, third-parry, stare-
certified institutions (including private healthcare providers, health
insurance agencies, private clinics, etc.). Funding for these programs
would likely derive from a variety of sources, including appropriations
earmarked for "Family Planning Programs" under Title X of the Public
Health Service Act'"6 and the Prevention First Act' as well as subsidies
146. See 42 U.S.C. 5§ 300-300a-6 (1970).
147. See Prevention First Act, H.R. 463, 111 th Cong. (2009) (proposing to "expand ac-
cess to preventive health care services that help reduce unintended pregnancy, reduce
abortions, and improve access to women's health care"). For a brief description of
President Obama's pledge to increase funding to prevent unintended pregnancy as
one of the Agenda items particularly pertaining to women see White House, Agenda:
Women (Feb. 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/women/ (emphasizing Pres-
ident Obama's pledge to "expand access to contraception, health information, and
prevention service to help reduce unintended pregnancies" through the enactment of
the Prevention First Act, a piece of legislation to which President Obama was an orig-
inal co-sponsor).
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from related sources, such as the Centers of Excellence in Women's
Health at the Department of Health and Human Services,""8 HIV/AIDS
prevention funding,' etc. Indeed, given the Obama Administration's
public commitment to the protection of abortion rights and the preven-
tion of unintended pregnancies, more funding will likely be dedicated to
the development of comprehensive sexual education programs, like the
MCC status proposal, in the near future.5 0
To be administered at the minor participant's option at the conclu-
sion of the MCC sexual education course, the MCC status assessment
would consist of an examination concerning the emotional, psychologi-
cal, sociological, and physical consequences of sexual activity. The
examination would not involve assessments of a minor's cognitive capac-
ity or normative assessments of morality. Rather, it would objectively
test substantive sexual and reproductive knowledge. Topics for testing
could include legal standards for consent, effective contraceptive use,
communication techniques for doctors, parents, and peers, STI trans-
mission and treatment, and reproductive options in the face of an
unintended pregnancy.
Upon successful completion of both the education program and
the assessment exam, minors would have the option to register with the
state for MCC status, like a license. Because a minor's capacity to
consent to both sexual activity and reproductive care would be
conditioned upon MCC status, any situation involving minor
reproductive or sexual decisions would first require the provider to
check the names of the involved parties against the MCC database. In
the case of statutory rape, MCC status would affirm the decisional
autonomy of sexually active minors and their partners. In the case of a
minor seeking an abortion, MCC status would allow the pregnant
minor to obtain an abortion without the psychological and physiological
dangers of delay caused by parental involvement requirements. Minors
without MCC status would be subject to the same requirements of
judicial bypass or parental notification/consent, therefore ensuring some
form of protection or support for minors who have not obtained MCC
status.
148. In the Agenda portion of the White House website, President Ohama has pledged his
support for researching women's health issues through the Centers of Excellence in
Women's Health at the Department of Health and Human Services. See White
House, supra note 147.
149. White House, supra note 147.
150. Id.
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11. CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
The MCC status proposal is desirable because it resolves not only
the specific problems created by conflicting age of consent and parental
involvement laws, but also the greater systemic issues confronting the
regulation of adolescent sexuality. By granting consensual capacity and
legal maturity through one license status, the MCC status proposal does
not place an irrational, arbitrary, and undue burden on a consenting
minor's abortion right. As a matter of public policy, the MCC status
proposal would promote more effective parent-child communication
and informed decision-making through sexual education. Indeed, by
ensuring parity between sexual consent capacity and reproductive au-
tonomy, the MCC status proposal overcomes all the constitutional and
policy problems created by conflicting age of consent and parental in-
volvement laws.
Further, the MCC status proposal overcomes the legislative schizo-
phrenia of the protectionism-versus-enablement paradigm. The MCC
status proposal advocates a comprehensive theory of consent in which
the law would be capable of recognizing differing levels of adolescent
maturity. The proposal replaces age as the baseline for consent capacity
with the voluntary manifestation of objective knowledge. In the same
way that driver education and licensure is designed to produce a uni-
form standard of safety for the driving population, the MCC status
proposal encourages minors to understand the consequences sexualac
tivity within a grander public health context. The MCC status program
is therefore fundamentally proactive and preventative rather than reactive
and retributive. Instead of permitting minor sexual consent at an arbi-
trary age and then demanding further demonstrations of maturity in the
crisis of an unwanted pregnancy, the MCC status recognizes sexual ma-
turity and consent capacity objectively and preemptively.
A. Likely Criticism and Response
While the licensure of sexual consent proposed under the MCC
proposal would likely be criticized as novel and unprecedented, state
intervention in sex, marriage, and reproduction is firmly established
both in the American tradition and around the world.' In the United
151. It is important to note that the MCC status proposal accepts the basic premise that
the state holds a historic stake in the regulation of adolescent sexuality. Thus, the
MCC status proposal attempts not to address whether the state's involvement in the
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States, marriages have been regulated by civil licensure since the found-
ing of the New England colonies.112 In fact, regulations for marriage
licenses have now been expanded to include blood test requirements,




States have further demonstrated a willingness to intervene in intimate
affairs, particularly in the realm of adolescent sexuality, through the
public design and funding of sexual education programs, sexual health
awareness campaigns and reproductive health clinics across the United
States.154 Most recently, there has been a surge in the discussion of wide-
spread HPV vaccination, a vaccine to prevent the spread of the sexually-
transmitted infection that causes cervical cancer. 15Many states are now
also considering compulsory HPV vaccinations for girls enrolled in
public schools.15 6 Indeed, when matters of public health, social welfare,
and government benefits are involved, the state demonstrates great com-
fort in the regulation of intimate affairs.I
Around the world, state regulation of adolescent sexuality is even
more prevalent, particularly in the form of comprehensive, and often
compulsory, sexual education. Indeed, in many countries, not only is it
generally accepted for the state to play an active role in the regulation of
adolescent sexuality, but such regulation often begins very early in ado-
lescence through the form of education and health care assistance. In
Japan, compulsory sexual education commences in schools for children
between the ages of ten and eleven. 15 In France, compulsory sexual
regulation of adolescent sexuality is paternalistic, but rather, how to use the state to
cultivate sexual responsibility amongst minors.
152. GEORGE ELLIorr HOWAR-D, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 127-32
(1904).
153. State Marriage License and Blood Test Requirements, FINDLAW.cOM, (2006), http://
family.findlaw.com/marriage/marriage-laws/marriage-blood-test.html.
154. HENRY J. KAISER F~m. FOUND., ISSUE UPDATE; Sex Education in the United States:
Policy and Politics (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.kff.org/youthhivstds/
upload/Sex- Educatio n- in-the- U-S-Policy-and- Pol itics. pdf.
155. In July 2008, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service added the HPV
vaccine to five vaccination requirements for all applicants to become legal permanent
residents of the United States. See USCI5, USCI5 Update: USCIS Changes Vaccina-
tion Requirements to Adjust Status to Legal Permanent Resident (July 24,
2008), available at www.uscis.gov/files/articleVacine%/2OReq.Ajust-Stat-.LPR_
20080724.pdf (announcing the USCIS' revisions to their vaccination requirements
for permanent resident status following recommendations from the CDC and the
Department of Health and Human Services).
156. See, e.g., Deana Pollard Sacks, Elements of Liberty, 61 SMU L. R.Ey. 1557, 1599
(2008); Lane Wood, A Young Vaccine for Young Girls: Should the Human Papillo ma-
virus Vaccination Be Mandatory for Public School Attendance?, 20 HEALTH LAW. 30, 31
no. 5 (June 2008).
157. Anastasia Touflexis, Sex Has Many Accents, TIME, May 24, 1993, at 66, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9 171,978575-1 ,00.html.
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education in schools includes thirty to forty hours of instruction, the
dissemination of contraception, and public awareness components.1
Germany has implemented compulsory sexual education as "a matter of
law by government duty" since 1992 and their program covers a broad
range of topics from the biological changes of puberty to the emotional
impact of abuse and STI transmission.'59 Perhaps one of the most world-
renowned sexual education programs, the Netherlands' "Lang leve de
liefde" ("Long Live Love") package was developed and subsidized by the
Dutch government in the 1980s to promote the development of strong
communication and decision-making skills, backed by substantive, sci-
entific knowledge of reproductive health.6 0 The program has been
applauded by several international health organizations as the reason
why the Netherlands has the lowest teen pregnancy rate in Europe and
the highest use of contraceptive devices by adolescents. 6 ' Like the Unit-
ed States, ages of consent in these countries range from fourteen to
eighteen years old.'62
Notably, most of the international sexual education programs de-
scribed above are implemented in countries that do not have parental
involvement requirements for minor abortions.'6 ' The legal problem of
balancing parental rights with minor sexual autonomy is therefore less
problematic in many of these European countries than it is in the Unit-
ed States. The MCC status proposal accounts for the more robust
tradition of parental rights in the United States by preserving parental
involvement requirements for minors who have not obtained MCC sta-
tus. This requirement balances the state's interest in the promotion of
158. Jon Slater, Britain: Sex Education Under Fire, THE UNESCO COURIER,
July/Aug. 2000, at 17, available at http://www.unesco.org/courier/2000_07/uk/
apprend2.htm (Across the Channel).
159. Press Release, Pressemeldung Bundesministerium fur Familie, Senioren, Frauen und
Jugend [Press Release by the Federal Administration for Families, Seniors, Women,
and Children], Sexualaufklarung in Europa [Sex Education in Europe] (Nov. 14,
2006), available at http://bildungsklick.de/pm/35091/ sexualaufklaerung-in-europal.
160. Guus Valk, The Dutch Model, THE UNESCO COURIER, July/Aug. 2000, at 19,
available at http://www.unesco.org/courier/2000_07/uklapprend2.htm.
161. Valk, supra note 160.
162. See AVERT, Worldwide Ages of Consent, http://www.avert.org/aofconsent.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2010) (presenting a chart comparing age of consent laws worldwide
that regulate male-to-female intercourse, male-to-male intercourse, and female-to-
female intercourse).
163. BBC, Europe's Abortion Rules, BBC NEws (Feb. 12, 2007), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6235557.stm. See also Iwr'L PLANNED PAURNT-HOOD
FED'N EUR. NETWORK, ABORTION LEGISLATION IN EUROPE (Updated Jan. 2007),
http://www.ippf.org/NR/rdonlyres/2EB28750-BA71-43F8-AE2A-8B55A275F86C/0/
Abortion_1egislation-Europe-jan2007.pdf (describing abortion regulations in Europe,
including minor parental involvement restrictions).
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minor sexual and reproductive maturity with the parental interest in
being involved in the reproductive decision making of children. The
primary difference, then, between the MCC status proposal and the
comprehensive sexual education programs practiced throughout Europe,
is that the MCC status proposal incorporates an objective and preemp-
tive way to assess minor consensual capacity while still providing for
parental involvement when necessary.
Distinguished from the risks of adult consensual sex, minor sexual
activity has long been specifically recognized as the legitimate subject of
state regulation and intervention in the United States. This regulation
has appeared in the form of public awareness campaigns, statutory rape
laws, contraceptive access laws, sexual education programs, and specific
public assistance for organizations dedicated to addressing teenage fami-
ly planning and unintended pregnancy."' 4 Framed in this light, licensing
minor consent capacity is consistent with a history of state regulation of
adolescent sexuality. However, unlike traditional regulatory measures,
the MCC status proposal is uniquely equipped to account for the fluidi-
ty of adolescent maturity vis- -vis the strong American tradition of
parental rights.
Unlike previous regulations, MCC status allows the law to individ-
ually assess and condition a minor's legal consent capacity upon a
qualitative demonstration of his or her own sexual knowledge. The state
has a legitimate social and financial interest in the promotion of respon-
sible adolescent sexual activity. Most recently, after Speaker of the House
Nancy Pelosi was criticized for the inclusion of contraceptive and family
planning funding in the recent stimulus package proposal, studies actu-
ally reaffirmed the economic benefits of comprehensive family planning
and the social costs of unintended pregnancies.' In fact, research by
National Bureau of Economic Research found that changes to a
state-level Medicaid policy that expanded eligibility for family planning
services reduced the number of unintended pregnancies by 4%, facili-
tating a greater earning potential for women who did not face
unintended pregnancies at an estimated increase of $6,800 per every
164. See, eg, ALAN GUTTMACHFR INST., http://www.gurtmacher.org (last visited Oct. 10,
2010) (research institute on family planning and reproductive care, with special pro-
grams dedicated to researching public policy affecting the sexual health of minors);
HENRY J. KAIsER FAR. FOUND. , http://www.kffiorg (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (re-
productive health care research and reform agency, with special publications on
minors' sexual health); PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www. plannedparenthood.org
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (leading family planning organization providing contra-
ceptive services and reproductive care).
165. See Nancy Folbre, Sex and the Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES BLDG (Feb. 5, 2009, 4:16 PM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/sex-and-the-stimuluts/.
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averted unintended pregnancy.'6 Such findings are consistent with
now-classic economic studies of the educational, career, and social bene-
fits to women who have access to contraception, directly linking access
to contraceptives to access to women's higher education and, corre-
spondingly, better paying jobs."6 ' All of this research supports the
conclusion that states have significant fiscal interests in the implementa-
tion of teenage sexual education and pregnancy prevention programs, in
addition to the aforementioned constitutional, public health and social
policy concerns.
The state has both historical precedent, in the form of existing age
of consent and reproductive rights laws, and a rational basis, in the form
of the unique social costs and benefits of teenage sex, to justify the regu-
lation of adolescent sexuality through the MCC status proposal. In the
same way that the state regulates and implements comprehensive drivers'
education and licensure to avoid personal injuries and maintain a stable
infrastructure, the state should to minimize the institutional costs of
minor sexual activity through the MCC status proposal. Likewise, in the
same way that the state organizes and confers benefits through the grant
of marriage licenses, a relationship of comparable privacy and intimacy,
so too can it organize, promote and support the social and public health
benefits of the comprehensive regulation of adolescent sexuality. Indeed,
the historical precedent, rational interest, and social need to evolve be-
yond the protectionist-versus-enablement paradigm all justify the
adoption of the MCC status proposal.
CONCLUSION
The inherent dynamism of adolescent sexual maturity poses a
unique challenge for the law. The existing legal system governing adoles-
cent sexuality fails to effectively regulate minor sexuality because laws
are polarized between enabling minors as adults and protecting them as
children. The sexual rights of minors are further complicated because
most regulations are enacted on a piecemeal basis without reference to
other laws regulating adolescent sexuality. Inconsistent legal recognition
of maturity under conflicting age of consent and parental involvement
166. Melissa S. Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Subsidized Contraception, Fertility, and Sexual
Behavior (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W13045, 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=986895.
167. See generally Martha J. Bailey, More Power to the Pill: The Impact of Contraceptive
Freedom on Women's Life Cycle Labor Supply, 121 QL. EcON. 289, 295 (2006);
Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of/the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and
Women's Career and Marriage Decisions, 1 10 J. POL. ECON 730, 747 (2002).
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laws demonstrates the particular constitutional and practical harms of
this flawed system. This Article argues that a system licensing minor
consent for both sexual and reproductive rights would overcome the
flaws of the protectionist-versus-enablement paradigm. It would also
ensure the type of consistent and rational regulation of adolescent sexu-
ality necessary for constitutionality. By promoting responsible sexual
behaviors through education and communication, the MCC status pro-
posal creates a system in which minors control their own consensual
capacity. The MCC status proposal shifts the marker for consensual ca-
pacity from the mere attainment of an age to the objective
demonstration of knowledge -and maturity. Through the MCC status
proposal, the state assumes a holistic stance toward the regulation of ad-
olescent sexuality that would support minors' sexual and reproductive
privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The MCC status pro-
posal requires that teens demonstrate a threshold amount of sexual
knowledge and maturity before recognizing the privilege of full deci-
sional autonomy. Thus, in the process of giving them the "keys" to their
sexual and reproductive autonomy, the MCC status also equips minors
with the information necessary to choose their own safe, fulfilling, and
socially- responsible journeys. t
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TABLE I
AGE OF CONSENT AND PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
Parental Involvement
State Age of Consent" for Minor Abotlion'
Alabama 16 Consent enforced
Alaska 16 Consent enjoined not enforced
Arizona 18 Consent enforced
Arkansas 16 Consent enforced
California 18 Consent enjoined not enforced
Colorado 17 Notification enforced
Connecticut 16
Delaware 18 Notification enforced atl 6
D.C. 16
Florida 18 Notification enforced
Georgia 16 Notification enforced
Hawaii 16
Idaho 18 Consent enforced
Illinois 17 Notification enjoined not enforced
Indiana 16 Consent enforced
Iowa 16 Notification enforced
Kansas 16 Notification enforced
Kentucky 16 Consent enforced
Louisiana 17 Consent enforced
Maine 16
Maryland 16 mature
Massachusetts 16 Consent enforced
Michigan 16 Consent enforced
Minnesota 16 Notification enforced
Mississippi 16 Consent enforced
Missouri 17 Consent enforced
Montana 16 Notification enjoined not enforced_
Nebraska 16 Notification enforced
Nevada 16 Notification enjoined not enforced
New Hampshire 16 Notification enjoined not enforced
New Jersey 16 Notification enjoined not enforced
New Mexico 16 Consent enjoined not enforced
NewYork 17
North Carolina 16 Consent enforced
North Dakota 18 Consent enforced
Ohio 16 Consent enforced
Oklahoma 16 Notification and consent enforced
Oregon 18
168. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO
STATE LAWS AND) REPORTING REQUIREMENTs 6 (2004).
169. See ALAN GUTtMACHCER INST., supra note 9.
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Parental Involvement
State Age of Consent'" for Minor Abortion'69
Pennsylvania 16 Consent enforced
Rhode Island 16 Consent enforced
South Carolina 16 Consent enforced at 17
South Dakota 16 Notification enforced
Tennessee 18 Consent enforced
Texas 17 Consent enforced
Utah 18 Notification and Consent enforced
Vermont 16
Virginia 18 Consent enforced
Washington 16
West Virginia 16 Notification enforced
Wisconsin 18 Consent enforced
Wyoming 16 Consent enforced
States with Age of Consent Below Parental Involvement Req. (unenjoined): 26
States with Parental Involvement Req.: 34
States with Parental Involvement Req. = Age of Consent :8
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